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                                          Abstract
                  American manufacturing exports became increasingly resource-
            intensive over the very period, roughly 1880-1920, during which the
            U.S. ascended to the position of world leadership in manufacturing.
            This paper challenges the simplistic view that the resource-intensity
            of manufacturing reflected the country's abundant geological
            endowment of mineral deposits. Instead, it shows that in the century
            following 1850 the U.S. exploited its natural resource potentials to a
            far greater extent than other countries and did so across virtually the
            entire range of industrial minerals. It argues that "natural resource
            abundance" was an endogenous. "socially constructed" condition that
            was not geologically pre-ordained. It examines the complex legal,
            institutional, technological and organizational adaptations that shaped
            the U.S. supply-responses to the expanding domestic and international
            industrial demands for minerals and mineral-products. It suggests that
            the existence of strong "positive feedbacks"--even in the exploitation
            of depletable resources--was responsible for the explosive growth of
            the American minerals economy.
            Keywords: Natural resources; U.S. industrial leadership; science-
            technology linkages; mining; petroleum exploration and exploitation;
            engineering education; positive feedbacks.
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          THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RESOURCE ABUNDANCE
                              
By the time of the First World War, the United States had attained world leadership in the
production of nearly every one of the major industrial minerals of that era: coal, iron ore, copper,
lead, zinc, silver, tungsten, molybdenum, petroleum, arsenic, phosphate, antimony, magnesite,
mercury, and salt, with strong second-place status in gold and bauxite. This fact of economic
history has not been entirely unappreciated in the past, and yet it has received relatively little
direct attention, either in discussions of the country's current economic performance, or in
historical accounts of the rise of the American economy to world pre-eminence.   Perhaps
"primary production" or "extractive industries" are regarded as primitive types of economic
activity, which advanced countries move away from as progress unfolds. Yet  American
manufacturing exports became increasingly resource-intensive over the very period in which the
country became the world's manufacturing leader, roughly 1880-1920.   It is arguable, indeed,1
that resource-intensity and materials-using biases are persistent characteristics of the American
economy down to the present day.  The full dimensions of American resource abundance, and
their implications for the pace and pattern of American economic progress, have yet to be
elaborated by economic historians.
    This paper asks a different, and perhaps more fundamental question: why did the United
States become the world's leading mineral-producing nation? The answer to this question may
appear trivially obvious to those approaching the matter from one of the traditional frameworks
of economics: Ricardian, neoclassical, or Heckscher-Ohlin models all presume that natural
resource production is fundamentally determined by a country's "endowment" of natural
resources. Surely resource abundance was a gift of nature, an example of what Parker calls the
"sheer luckiness of the American economy."    When George Otis Smith, director of the United2
States Geological Survey, wrote in 1919 that "the United States is more richly endowed with
mineral wealth than any other country," he expressed the best available scientific knowledge of
his day.3
Our question may appear to have a transparently simple answer, but this paper reports
that "it ain't necessarily so." Minerals with economic value do indeed occur unevenly across the
surface of the earth, but between 1850 and 1950, the United States exploited its resource potential
to a far greater extent than other countries of the world. The abundance of American natural
resources did not derive exclusively from geological endowment, we argue, but reflected the
2intensity of search; technologies of extraction, refining, and utilization; market development and
transportation costs; and legal, institutional, and political structures affecting all of these.  The
situation of natural resource abundance, no less than the condition of so-called technological
leadership, is a socially constructed state.  Its formation is more appropriately viewed as a
process endogenous to the economic and political system, rather than simply a predetermined
set of physical endowment constraints imposed exogenously -- by "Nature."  To buttress these
assertions, we begin with a quantitative demonstration of American "overachievement" in
minerals, and then proceed to trace the emergence of this leadership position chronologically.
These findings lead us to an account of the main institutional foundations for American mineral
resource abundance.
1. American Minerals in a World Context
     The first two columns of Table 1 present figures on the 1913 U.S. share of the total world
production of nine important minerals, and the most recently available estimates of the U.S. share
of world reserves. To be sure, the concept of mineral "reserves" suffers from inherent limitations.
By their very nature, total potential supplies cannot be known with certainty. Of those that are
known, the percentage that are economically recoverable depends upon the price of the
commodity and the cost of extraction.  These sorts of dividing lines can and do change because
of shifts in demand and supply conditions (reflecting physical investments or new technology).
The figures in the second column are not very different, however, from those obtained using the
alternative concept of "reserve base," which includes resources that are known but marginal or
subeconomic. Still, we have no way of assuring that comparison of the 1913 production flows and
1989 stocks is not subject to biases. Despite these qualifications, the present-day estimates provide
a useful benchmark, and Table 1 presents a striking picture: for every mineral on the list, U.S.
production was disproportionate to what we now believe to be the country's share of world
resources. In most cases the gap was huge. Only for coal do the contemporary reserve estimates
suggest an obvious geological reason for American domination of world production.
To help clarify the historical issues, one may well ask further questions regarding this
evidence. Do the small U.S. shares of world reserves in 1989 mainly reflect the cumulative effects
of two centuries of extraction?  Or, alternatively, have new discoveries since 1913 mainly
occurred in other parts of the world? These questions are addressed in the last two columns of
Table 1, which add 1989 estimates of reserves or reserve base to cumulative U.S. production of
the mineral in question between 1913 and 1989. They constitute, in other words, the best available
3contemporary estimates of what reserve levels actually were in 1913.  It is evident that 1913 U.S.
production far exceeded its "endowed" share.  To be sure, both accrual and depletion processes
were operative, and the balance between them varies from one category of mineral to the next.
If all the U.S. gold and lead ever produced could be put back in the ground, the country's relative
standing in these industries would be dramatically altered, but total world reserves would only
be increased by about twenty percent. In other cases, such as copper or bauxite, the impact of
cumulative U.S. production on world reserves would be far less: about six percent for copper, less
than one percent for bauxite. Figure 1 illustrates the important example of petroleum, in which
the United States dominated world production until the 1960s. Although cumulative U.S. oil
production amounts to several times the current level of estimated U.S. reserves, both quantities
are small relative to estimates of world reserves (which continue to grow nearly every year). It
seems clear that the United States exploited its geological potential well ahead of the rest of the
world.
     How did U.S. mineral production compare, one may ask, to the country's resource
endowments as they were then known to geologists and mining engineers? Global surveys were
then in their infancy, but in response to concerns about resource adequacy in Scandinavia and
the United States, the XIth International Geological Congress sponsored an ambitious report on
Iron Ore Resources of the World in 1910.  The Congress commissioned reports from expert
observers around the world, asking them to distinguish "actual" from "potential" reserves, and
taking note of the degree of investigation entering into the estimates. According to the report, the
United States was not only the country most richly endowed with actual iron ore reserves (22.6
percent of the total), but also had the greatest opportunity for future expansion (containing fully
70 percent of the world's estimated potential reserves). In a comparable survey by the United
Nations just forty-five years later, the U.S. share of known reserves had fallen to 8.1 percent.   By
far the most important reason was the discovery and development of vast new reserve centers
in Asia, South America, Africa, the Soviet Union, and Australia. Figure 2 depicts the evolution
of the estimate of iron ore reserves over time.  A similar survey on coal resources by the XII
International Geologic Congress in 1913 had an equally striking conclusion about American
abundance.  That report found that the United States contained more than half of the entire coal
supplies in the world.  The U.S. is still well endowed with coal, but its estimated share of reserves
today is less than one-fourth, indicating that deposits in many parts of the world were simply not
known as of 1913.
     This evidence suggests that America's exploitation of its mineral potential was far ahead
of the rest of the world in the aggregate, but the same conclusion does not necessarily hold in
4comparison with Europe. Table 2 presents similar calculations for the aggregated nations of
western and eastern Europe, encompassing an area about half the size of the continental United
States (when the Soviet Union is excluded). When these smaller countries are combined in this
way, their total production actually exceeded that of United States for coal, bauxite, zinc, iron ore,
and lead (though not for petroleum, copper, phosphate and gold). More importantly for our
purposes, the figures in Table 2 show that European production in 1913 was even more
disproportionate to what is now believed  to be that continent's endowment.  One might interpret
these figures as implying that within the constricted orbit of the "advanced capitalist economy"
of the 19th century, the United States really did benefit from an important advantage in mineral
endowment.  The settlement of America was closely bound up with the natural resource
demands of technologies inherited from Europe, identified by such authorities as Wrigley and
Thomas as critical to the Industrial Revolution's break with the past.   As rising industrial4
demands put pressure on limited European resources, the mineral frontier spilled overseas, the
United States being among the first to respond.
 Even on this reading, however, mineral development in the United States was distinctly
unimpressive during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century.  As we recount in the next
section, realization of the country's mineral potential came only after large-scale mobilization of
human resources and applications of new technologies. Although the US mineral sector certainly
did draw upon European skills and investment capital, by the end of the century it had moved
well beyond this starting point.  In some cases, such as copper, U.S. metallurgical technologies
emerged that were far in advance of those in Europe; while in others, such as petroleum, the
mineral itself was all but unknown previously, and the adaptation included the development of
an entire range of uses for this newly abundant material.  Clearly more was involved than mere
"endowment."
 In our view, the rapidity of American mineral development should be seen both as cause
and as consequence of the post-Civil War deployment of human and physical resources to this
sector. The high returns to early investments encouraged further investment, resulting not in
sharply diminishing returns (as it might have in Europe), but in apparently ever-increasing rates
of discovery and production. Our argument is not wholly novel. The suggestion that there was
an important "positive feedback" from the exploitation of known geological endowments to the
expansion of those endowments was put forward by the compiler of the 1910 report on iron ore:
One of the most striking results of the collection of the reports 
is that areas covered by the reports of group A [reliable calculations
based on actual investigations] contain much greater quantities of
5 known and recorded iron ores than is the case with those covered by
reports of group B [figures based only on very approximate estimates].
This may be expressed in other words to the effect that the more a
district becomes known and its industrial resources are developed,
the greater become also its actual iron ore resources. 5
One could hardly ask for a better description of positive feedback at work.
When we turn our attention to the other continents of the world, the uniqueness of the
United States stands out clearly.   Table 3 presents comparable figures for the Soviet Union,
chiefly Russia, showing a distinct pattern of underachievement relative to modern reserve
estimates, except for petroleum.  The Russian example is particularly interesting in this context,
since the USSR engaged in a crash program of mineral development in the late 1920s and 1930s,
achieving a rate of growth in production between 1926 and 1937 more than twice as fast of that
of the fastest expansion period for U.S. minerals in the twentieth century, 1902-1917.   This6
experience, as well as others somewhat less dramatic elsewhere around the world, confirm the
essential truth of the compiler's insight.  Whether such programs were prudent, or had economic
consequences similar to the earlier American case, are of course different questions entirely.
2. Emergence of the American Minerals Economy: Timing and Causes
     Another set of clues comes from the timing of the explosive emergence of the mineral
industries sector of the U.S. economy. From our present vantage point it is difficult to appreciate
that so recently as a century ago the view of the United States as a region vastly endowed with
valuable natural resources did not strike contemporaries as a hackneyed platitude. Rather, it was
something of a novelty, and its assertion was the occasion for expressions of pride in national
achievements (for example, Rothwell 1895).
To be sure, the practice of describing the European settlements in North America as
exemplifying "land abundance" and its reciprocal condition, "labor scarcity," was of much longer
standing. In 1751, Benjamin Franklin observed that Europe was "generally full settled with
husbandmen, manufactureres, etc., and therefore cannot now much increase in people;" whereas
      "[l]and being ... plenty in America, and so cheap as that a laboring man,
     that understands husbandry, can in a short time save money enough to
     purchase a piece of new land sufficient for a plantation,
     whereon he may subsist a family, such are not afraid to marry...."7
6     
An abundance of land was recognized to be not quite the same thing as an abundance of natural
resources in general, or of mineral resources in particular. Adam Smith echoed Franklin on the
stimulus to economic prosperity and population increase provided by "the plenty and cheapness
of good land," and at the same time remained decidedly skeptical about the business of mining
for precious and semi-precious metals. He judged it to be "the most disadvantageous lottery in
the world, or the one in which the gain of those who draw the prizes bears the least proportion
to the loss of those who draw the blanks."   Thus, Smith took pains to point out that while Spain's8
quest for silver and gold was a motive for colonization that had also animated the New World
adventures of other nations of Europe, the latter's expectations of discovering great wealth in
American mines turned out to be mostly chimerical:
     "It was more than a hundred years after the first settlement of the Brazils,
 before any silver, gold, or diamond mines were discovered there. In the
 English, French, Dutch, and Danish colonies, none have ever yet been 
discovered; at least none that are at present supposed to be worth the working."9
Franklin was thus reiterating a familiar eighteenth century theme -- of the disappointments that
awaited Northern European seekers after American mineral treasure -- when he wrote in 1790:
"Gold and silver are not the produce of North America, which has no mines."10
      The belated emergence of the American mineral economy has not passed entirely
un-noticed by historians of the subject. In The Development of Mineral Industry Education in the
United States, Thomas Thornton Read remarked:
     "Although the first colonists in the area that is now the United States, 
whether Spanish, French or English in nationality, were usually keenly
     interested in the possibilities of mineral wealth, it is a curious and
interesting fact that none of them happened upon the mineral deposits that
 eventually were to make this the greatest mineral-producing country; 
up to 1800 it would probably have been rated as rather poor in minerals."11
The first real excitement over mineral finds came at the beginning of the 19th century,
when large gold nuggets (one weighing 28 lbs.) were discovered by white settlers along the
eastern border of the Appalachian range, in Virginia and the Carolinas.  It was the 1820s that first
7saw the emergence of a wave of activity that might qualify, even vaguely, as a "mining boom."
During 1824-1829 the search for gold was resumed and attracted much attention; there was a
concurrent rapid development of lead mining in Missouri and on the Upper Mississippi in the
Galena district, where Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin adjoin one another.  Regular shipments of
anthracite coal to the Philadelphia market from the Lehigh region of eastern Pennsylvania also
commenced in the 1820s, a development that came fully three decades after the discovery of
anthracite in that region.  More concerted efforts to exploit commercially this novel form of
mineral fuel had been stimulated by the high prices of Virginia bituminous coal in Philadelphia
during the War of 1812; but success waited upon both the improvement of transport facilities and
the dawning understanding that the stuff had practical uses other than as a paving material, and
would indeed release a lot of thermal energy if burned in a grate.12
Quantitatively speaking, the country's position of leadership in mineral production was
a post-Civil War development, albeit one for which many of the behavioral elements were
observable earlier.  Harvey and Press note that prior to 1870, Britain was self-sufficient in iron
ore, copper, lead, and tin, and "Britain was easily the most important mining nation in the
world."   U.S. lead mine production, for example, did not surpass that of Britain until the late13
1870s (Figure 3).  Leadership in coal came even later.  Despite a vastly larger area, U.S. coal
production did not pass Germany's until 1880, and Britain's only in 1900 (Figure 4).  Leadership
or near-leadership in copper, iron ore, antimony, magnesite, mercury, nickel, silver, and zinc all
occurred during the period between 1870 and 1910.   Surely this correspondence in timing14
among so many different minerals cannot have been merely coincidental.15
One might be tempted to explain the apparent coincidence very simply, on the view that
the rise of mineral production was essentially a reflection of the territorial expansion of the
nation.  How could the mineral deposits of Colorado, South Dakota, and Montana have been
discovered and developed until these regions had been brought within the borders of the nation
and settlement begun?  But the phenomena under discussion cannot be explained away in this
manner.  For one thing, some of the most dramatic production growth did not occur in the far
west, but in the older parts of the nation.  Copper in Michigan, coal in Pennsylvania and Illinois,
oil in Pennsylvania and later Indiana, are all examples.  The California gold rush was only the
largest and most spectacular of a series of mineral discoveries and "rushes" that occurred in
almost all parts of the country and accelerated across the nineteenth century.16
Nonetheless the opening of the vast western public domain to minerals exploration was
undeniably a major part of the story.  This association merely underscores our main point, that
Americans were looking to the land for very different purposes than were the Mexicans or the
8European powers contending for the Oregon territory.  Mineral discoveries were not mere
byproducts of an inexorable settlement process.  They were instead the results of purposeful
exploration, and often occurred in areas that were (and in many cases, still are) remote from
population centers.  Exploiting these resources required extensive investment in transportation
and other forms of infrastructure, and in many cases major new technologies of extraction and
processing as well.   American mineral development stands in marked contrast to the case of
nineteenth-century Russia, whose failure to develop its vast reserves of coal and iron ore is
attributed to the inconvenient location of major deposits thousands of miles from population
centers, as well as to unevenness of ore quality, high transportation cost, and the lateness of
discoveries.  Every one of these "handicaps" could as easily be ascribed to nineteenth-century17
America, yet they did not stop the country's rise to world mineral leadership.
The example of copper further illustrates our view that the American experience was
unique, in comparison with other well-endowed parts of the world.  Figure 5 shows that Chilean
copper production exceeded that of the US until 1880, and nearly recovered its supremacy again
in the 1930s.  In between, however, during the 1880-1930 era of US minerals ascendancy, there
was no comparison.  The US performance represented far more than discovery, but a revolution
in copper metallurgy as well, including such new processes as bessemerizing, pyritic smelting,
and electrolytic refining, that allowed the exploitation of low-grade "porphyry" coppers.
Together, these advanced techniques allowed US firms to take advantage of the empirical
regularity known as "Lasky's Law," an inverse relationship between the grade of the ore and the
size of the deposit. The huge fixed costs entailed in such projects led the copper industry into
increasing dominance by a handful of giant firms.  The US led the world both in the size of its
copper firms and in the development of the new technologies.   Clearly the intuition is mistaken18
that places "resource-based" development necessarily at the "low-technology" end of a spectrum
of alternatives.
3. Private Incentives: The American Law of Mining
A logical place to begin in interpreting the unique performance of the U.S. mineral
economy is with the incentive structure, the rules of access and the character of the property
rights that determined the balance between effort and expected reward.  Both admirers and
critics of U.S. mining have agreed that nineteenth-century U.S. mineral law was unique, in that
the government claimed no ultimate legal title to the nation's minerals, not even on the public
domain.   The United States maintained the principle of open access for prospecting; indeed the19
9very term "prospector" is an Americanism dating from the 1850s, referring to a social type said
to be unique to this country.   All other major mining systems reflected the lasting influence of20
the ancient tradition by which minerals were regarded as the personal property of the lord or
ruler, who granted user rights as concessions if he so chose.
If the legal regime for U.S. mineral development was uniquely liberal, this status may not
have descended from deep philosophical or constitutional principles set down by the founders.
The Land Ordinance of 1785 did indeed claim for the federal government "one third part of all
gold, silver, lead and copper mines" on the public domain, and in the early nineteenth century,
the federal government asserted these property rights forcefully, trying during one important
phase  to regulate mining activity closely for revenue purposes.  Between 1807 and 1846, the
government managed a leasing system for lead mines, first in Missouri, then in the Galena district
of Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin.   During the 1820s and 1830s, the "Galena Experiment" seems21
to have functioned fairly smoothly: miners obtained exclusive permits to work a given area, and
were required to bring their ore to one of the officially licensed smelters, from whom the
government collected a ten percent royalty.  Between 1825 and 1829, production grew rapidly,
and federal revenues were enhanced.  The system fell apart in the 1830s, however, because of
noncompliance on all sides: by the miners, who evaded the licensed smelters; by the smelters,
who refused to pay the royalties; and by federal agents, who fraudulently sold mineral land at
minimum prices as farmland, often for their own personal benefit.  An estimated three-fourths
of mineral lands passed into private hands in this way.   Attempts to revive the leasing system22
for Michigan copper lands in the 1840s were no more successful, and leasing was repealed in
1846.
The liberal character of federal policy, it seems, derived less from philosophical principles
than from lack of enforcement powers.  This weakness was underscored all the more in 1848
when gold was discovered 3000 miles away, on the American River near Sacramento, California.
Thus it was that the great California gold boom occurred under a virtually complete absence of
governmental authority, and technically constituted trespassing.   The principle of open access23
for exploration on the public domain was simply a de facto reality.  In these chaotic conditions,
"miners' meetings" in local camps or districts drew up simple rules for recording, enforcing,
working and transferring claims, in an effort to preserve order and minimize violent disputes.
Many of the elements of the mining camp rules ultimately became codified in the federal Mining
Laws of 1866 and 1872: open access for exploration; exclusive rights to mine a specific site upon
proof of discovery; limits on the size of individual claims; and the requirement that a claim be
worked at a certain frequency or else be subject to forfeit.  Since the publication of Charles Shinn's
10
Mining Camps: A Study in American Frontier Government in 1885, these codes have been
celebrated by historians as examples of  fraternal cooperation among rugged individualists, and
by economists as illustrations of the endogenous rise of secure property rights in the absence of
effective governmental authority.    This perspective deserves close scrutiny.24
If it were indeed true that stable, simple rule structures grew up from the consensi of early
mining camps, there would be little reason to expect that such codes would provide efficient
incentives for future output growth over any lengthy span of time.  Any agreed-upon rules might
be better than violent warfare, but the earliest miners to arrive would have every reason to
operate in their own joint interest relative to potential newcomers, especially on such issues as
the maximum size of individual claims, and the number of days per week that a claim must be
worked.  Indeed, McCurdy reports that political settlements within mining camps were regularly
disrupted by inflows of outsiders, who mustered new majorities to alter regulations in favor of
freer and more equitable access to the choicest sites.   Perhaps partly because the local rules did25
change frequently, allegations of claim-jumping were common, and the resulting disputes
"inundated the courts with actions for ejectment." It is true that the California legislature, unable
to agree on policies of its own, gave legal authority to local codes "when not in conflict with the
constitution and laws of this state." But the state courts did not simply adopt and give the force
of law to every local camp code.  Instead, using broad discretionary judicial powers in the
absence of specific legislative direction, the courts tried carefully to balance the rights of
established miners against the desirability of continuing access for new arrivals, freely invoking
such slippery notions as "reasonable use" and "public purpose," giving some weight but not
ultimate authority to "customary" local codes.  As Stephen J Field wrote for the California
Supreme Court in 1860: "The whole doctrine of possession must be controlled and modified by
the peculiar nature of the subject and by surrounding circumstances."26
A more basic shortcoming of the property rights literature on this subject is that it is
primarily addressed to questions of static efficiency in resource allocation, when the major
historical issues have to do with the economic incentives to engage in costly search activity under
conditions of high uncertainty and doubtful appropriability.  It is far from clear that rules to
safeguard fair and efficient resource use ex post (i.e., after a discovery has been made) will also
function successfully as incentives for search, ex ante. For example, the limitation on the size of
individual claims, which was a feature of virtually all of the early codes, though entirely
reasonable in the context of a functioning mining camp, surely diminishes the expected payoff
to a major discovery in a new location. Much of the work on property rights begs this question,
by taking the major discoveries as exogenous, and tracing the consequences for property rights
11
in the newly-invigorated industry in question.   Although the timing of any particular discovery27
will of course be subject to elements of chance, and hence might be considered exogenous with
respect to the economic variables in a given geographic setting, in the aggregate this approach
takes as exogenous the very success in mineral development that we have set ourselves to
explain!  
An earlier writer did advance a logical and intelligent argument linking mineral
supremacy to the American law of mining.  Writing in 1918, the Colorado mining authority
Theodore Van Wagenen argued that the country's unique performance was attributable to two
basic principles of the law: (1) "free prospecting privileges, coupled with simple and inexpensive
rules for the initiation of titles..." and (2) "the extralateral right of pursuit for all forms of mineral
deposits that possess continuity in length and depth..." The latter principle was said to be of
particular importance in encouraging those forms of mining that required heavy fixed capital
investment, by allowing the investor to capture the full value of a vein of ore, wherever it might
lead.  Van Wagenen concluded: "This is the magnet that first attracted the prospector, and which
has ever since held his interest and retained his services.  No mining district in the world has ever
been so thoroughly explored as that of the western United States, nor does any begin to compare
with it in results obtained..."   This interpretation has the ring of plausibility and the charm of28
simplicity.  But it is misleading in essential respects.
In the first place, much of the progress of the minerals economy was not in fact carried
under the auspices of the federal mining laws, but through evasion of these laws.  Coal lands, for
example, were explicitly exempted from the Mining Laws of 1866 and 1872.  An act of 1864
authorized sales of coal land by auction, but no land was ever auctioned under this act.  An act
of 1873 authorized the sale of coal land by claim and patent; but of the estimated 6 million acres
of coal land transferred into private hands between 1873 and 1906, only 7 percent used this
system.   Most of the coal land was dispensed as farmland, or under some other laws.  The same29
was true of the iron lands in the Lake Superior district.  The states of Minnesota and Wisconsin
were exempted from the Mining Laws, and the bulk of the area was fraudulently privatized
under the provision of the Homestead Act.30
Second, as Van Wagenen's own world survey reveals, it would be difficult to maintain
that either of these principles were truly unique to the United States.  Free prospecting also
prevailed in western Canada, Mexico, and most of South America; elsewhere, requiring a modest
fee for a prospecting license (such as the "miner's right" purchasable for £1 in Australia) could
hardly have been decisive.   Sumner La Croix points out that the legal rules adopted in Victoria
and New South Wales at the time of the Australian gold rush, though initially driven by the
12
colonial governments' desire to control settlement and raise revenue, in short order developed
along lines similar in their basic structure to those in the United States.   Indeed, a careful31
comparative study of American and Australian mining law published in 1910 found much to be
said in favor of the latter, both in terms of maintaining  incentives and minimizing wasteful
disputation and respect for the law: "The discovery doctrine has been responsible for more
essentially false declarations than probably any other enactment on the American statute books.
The extralateral right doctrine has resulted in an endless amount of litigation, involving the
absolutely unproductive expenditure of millions..."32
 The principle of extralateral rights had ancient origins; it was elaborated in Agricola's
famous essay on mining (translated by Herbert Lou Henry Hoover).  With minor variations, it
was observed in Germany, Britain, and Spain as well.  If it was not adopted universally, the
reason may well be that the doctrine was by no means as clearcut in practice as it may sound in
principle.  Where lode-veins were distinct and continuous, it may be appropriate to allow the first
discoverer to pursue a vein once started, even under another person's surface land.  But where
mineral deposits were of a different character, where veins were fractured or discontinuous, with
branches on various levels and outcroppings at numerous locations, rival extralateral rights could
be the subject of endless litigation.  The most numerous and expensive cases involved the "apex
law" in copper mining, the principle that a vein belonged to the owner of its origin, or apex.  The
celebrated figure of Frederick Augustus Heinze, a mining engineer who did not "relish
drudgery," made a fortune through  strategic purchase of apex claims in Montana, putting him
in position to hold up giant copper companies for payment. Many mining experts urged repeal,
calling it "an absurd law" that had created "a chaos of confusion."  But apex litigation was
ultimately circumvented, not by progress in the law but by widespread consolidation of mining
property, with agreements on vertical boundaries between adjoining owners -- a private adoption
of a "foreign" legal doctrine.33
In the case of petroleum, the breathtaking rise of the industry occurred under the aegis
of a manifestly inadequate legal precept known as the "rule of capture."  Analogous to the apex
rule for hard-rock minerals, the doctrine held that a well owner had legal title to any oil drawn
from the ground onto his property, regardless of the original source or location of the oil.  The
result was a classic illustration of common-pool resource problems, generating huge inefficiencies
in the form of excessive drilling costs, and saddling the industry with extremes of instability in
production and prices, as drillers raced to be the first to pump from any newly-discovered pool.
Yet the system resisted reform down to the 1930s.  As Gary Libecap and his co-authors
demonstrate, the logical appeal of unitization in the oil fields was thwarted by chronic disputes
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over the value of leases, and by distributional issues persistently pressed by a powerful lobby of
independent oil men.   Can one reasonably argue that the development of the American oil34
industry represents a response to secure property rights and the rule of an evolving, ever-more-
precisely defined body of law?  The system did indeed encourage maximum rate of extraction
from an oil field once discovered; but if it had also resulted in the cessation of all oil exploration,
economists would have no difficulty rationalizing this outcome.
None of this discussion is intended to reject the simple assertion that the U.S. rise to world
mineral leadership was facilitated by an accommodating legal environment.  We merely mean
to argue that laws did not function as an exogenously defined incentive system, but as flexible
and tolerant instruments, responsive to the changing demands of the minerals industries.  State
courts and legislatures did not merely define legal rules to encourage the release of private
entrepreneurial energies.  Instead, they actively encouraged development, by such measures as
tax exemption for mine shafts and buildings, low taxes on mining income, statutes of limitations
on claims disputes, and even the use of eminent domain rights on behalf of private mining
companies to help guarantee access to underground mines.   As the rise of mineral production35
came to rely increasingly on large corporate organizations using sophisticated technologies,
federal and state authorities accommodated by waiving the early mining-camp limits on the
number of claims that an individual or corporation could file. The fee for patenting such claims
was fixed at a nominal level in 1872 ($2.50 to $5.00), and remained unchanged thereafter.  Behind
these measures lay a broad local, state and federal consensus on the desirability of mineral
development, and an emerging set of networks operating increasingly at the national level in
support of this goal.
4. Geological Surveys and Public Knowledge Infrastructure
Provision of geological information was perhaps the most important initial step in the
collective enterprise of resource discovery and exploitation.  Recognition of the private economic
value of such information drew geologists at an early stage directly into lucrative employments
in the business of exploring for mineral wealth.  According to Robert Bruce, geologists were the
most conspicuous among those antebellum scientists (about 14 percent of the total) listed in the
Dictionary of American Biography who drew their livelihoods chiefly from private industry
rather than educational and government employments.   The popular perception that they had36
a "map to the buried treasure" helped to form and maintain a business constituency to whose
interests scientists engaged in the study of geology, paleontology, and topography were able to
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appeal repeatedly, and successfully, when seeking governmental patronage for their endeavors
to augment the stock of scientific knowledge.  The resulting body of geographic and geological
information formed a critical part of the public knowledge infrastructure that supported the
exploration and development activities of the U.S. minerals industry.
From the very first state survey, authorized in North Carolina in 1823 during the
mounting excitement over gold finds in the region, the funding of state geological surveys was
the leading form of direct aid that state governments provided for science in the antebellum era.
More than half of George P. Merrill's massive study, The First One Hundred Years of American
Geology (1824) is devoted to "The Era of State Surveys," 1830-1880.   The establishment of a State
Geological Survey in Massachusetts in 1830 was followed closely by similar undertakings in
fourteen other states during the 1830s.  By 1860 twenty-nine of the thirty-three states had
sponsored surveys at one time or another.  The states supported not only the field work of
geologists, but also the publication of their sometimes voluminous findings.37
The discoveries in the Michigan copper region provide a striking early instance of the role
of these surveys and geologists' involvement in exploration and mineral resource exploitation.
In 1840, the first scientific exploration of the Keweenaw peninsula was undertaken by Douglass
Houghton, first geologist of the new state.  Houghton's report, indicating the presence of fabulous
copper deposits there, led Congress to appropriate funds for the purchase of lands from the
Chippewa Indians in 1841.  During the ensuing rush of individual prospectors and mining
companies, a federal geological survey was begun under the direction of Charles T. Jackson, a
leading geologist and chemist in Boston.  Completion of this survey in 1850 provided the first
geological maps of the district adequate to support rational exploration and development work.
The Michigan copper deposits were the first major U.S. field to be developed, and also launched
a number of noteworthy scientific careers.  Josiah Whitney, a young protege of Jackson's who had
been sent off to Europe to pursue interests in chemistry, returned in the summer of 1845 to work
in the Copper Country as a geologist for a mining company.  Forsaking chemistry, Whitney soon
joined the staff of Jackson's survey in 1847, and within a few years had established himself as a
leading industrial consultant: "Making five hundred dollars a month, he remarked in 1853, he
could not afford to be a Yale professor."   His reputation was further enhanced by his publication38
the following year of The Metallic Wealth of the United States, the first comprehensive work on
American ore deposits, a book that  became widely known, and helped to gain him a position as
director of a state survey for California in 1860.
Despite Whitney's remark about relative salaries, university professors of that era could
sometimes be  entrepreneurial indeed while on the job. An early example was the career of J.P.
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Lesley, who graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1838, and then worked on the first
state geological survey.  After a decade in the ministry, he published A Manual of Coal and Its
Topography in 1856, and in the same year became secretary of the American Iron Association.
He also worked as a private consultant, and in 1857 his office stationery carried the following
letterhead: "Geology and Topography. Geological and other Maps constructed; Surveys of Coal
Lands made; Mineral Deposits examined; Geological Opinions given to guide purchasers, and
Reports made to Owners and Agents. Orders for elaborate Topographical Surveys from Rail-road
and other companies, will be executed in scientific principles, and in the highest style of the art."
Two years later he joined the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania, was made dean of the
science department in 1872, and dean of the new Towne Scientific School in 1875.  He was
librarian, secretary, and vice-president of the American Philosophical Society, and a charter
member of the National Academy of Sciences.  During all this time he continued his consulting
activities, traveling in 1863 to Europe for the Pennsylvania Railroad to study the Bessemer steel
process. He also served as state geologist, directed the second Pennsylvania geological survey,
and for four years edited a weekly newspaper,  United States Railroad and Mining Register.39
With the opening of the trans-Mississippi west after the Civil War, there was a
commensurate expansion of the scale of resources committed to geological surveys.  The federal
government already had some relevant experience.  Two generations of army officers and
engineers had established a tradition in which topography was valued as the highest form of
peacetime knowledge, and civilian scientists were often invited to join the western expeditions
of the Corps of Topographical Engineers.   Thus it was natural that in 1867 Clarence King, a40
civilian alumnus of the Sheffield Scientific School at Yale and of the Whitney survey in California,
would approach the Corps of Engineers with his proposal that the War Department  allocate
funds for the Geological Exploration of the Fortieth Parallel. Congressional authorization was
swift, and the survey (along the route of the Pacific railroad) got underway the same year.
The first publication from this investigation was out by 1870.  The work, Mining Industry,
added substantially to the geological knowledge of the district's gold and silver deposits, and
contemporaries saw particular value in its chapters on methods and equipment for digging and
treating the ores at Comstock.  In 1872, King displayed his shrewd sense for mobilizing industrial
support for scientific enterprises when he and his field team discovered and exposed a fraudulent
mining scheme, involving the seeding of secret grounds with uncut diamonds, which had
completely fooled one of the ablest mining engineers of the day.  The San Francisco Bulletin, after
lauding King for having done the public "a memorable service," went on to acclaim
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"the practical value, in the ordinary business of society, of scientific education
 and research.... These public surveys `pay' in more senses than one, and 
 even those who care nothing for wider and fuller knowledge for its own
 sake, must hereafter admit that Government expends no money more
 wisely and usefully."41
This triumph had direct private benefits for King as well.  He was besieged by offers to examine
property, and according to a friend, "he never charges less than $5000 to look at a mine."42
The most enduring significance of the Exploration of the Fortieth Parallel was
institutional, for it exemplified a conception of government science that combined economic
geology and technology; that idea carried over in the founding of the U.S. Geological Survey in
1879, and its development under its first director -- Clarence King.  The Geological Survey
emerged as the leading scientific bureau of the post-Civil War era and was the most productive
governmental research agency of the nineteenth century.  It enjoyed the advantages of a dual
organization, "wielding the power of the government bureau while enjoying the freedom of the
scientific society," which it used to make geology and paleontology the leading research sciences
in America.   The payoff to the early topographical and metallurgical work of the USGS in
western mining centers had a lasting impact on the popular appreciation of the practical benefits
of scientific research.   It was left to King's astute successor, J.W. Powell, to extend the work of43
the bureau east of the Missippi, and finally to secure (in 1882) congressional appropriations to
begin the preparation of a geological map of the entire United States, not simply the public
domain.  Although private professional work while on the staff was not permitted, the survey
acquired a reputation as an ideal steppingstone toward success in the mining sector.44
The development of the petroleum industry exhibits many of the elements that were
essential to rapid exploitation of mineral deposits in the United States, as well as the evolving
institutional relationships among government agencies, academic institutions, and corporations.
In the initiation of this industry, the role of applied science was negligible.  T. T. Read writes:
The boring of deep wells for brine and water was so old a technique that books
had been published on the subject in Europe, while for nearly 2000 years the
Chinese had practiced it without writing much about it.  When the first well in
this country specifically intended to produce petroleum. . . was put down at
Titusville in 1859, it was bored by an experienced brine-well driller, "Colonel"
Billy Smith, and involved nothing novel except the idea that crude petroleum
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would come out of it instead of brine.
He adds that the problem of where to drill the wells was solved, in the beginning, "by putting
down the first one near where petroleum came to the surface, and moving outward till the
boundaries of the pool had been passed."45
As petroleum discoveries moved onto more difficult terrain, drilling was facilitated by
technological improvements, such as the replacement of the cable drill by the rotary drill.
Already used with considerable success in drilling for water, the rotary drill was first applied to
petroleum production around the turn of the century, including the Spindletop gusher of 1901.46
In addition to technological changes, the application of petroleum geology played a critical role
in the development of the industry.  The increasing use of petroleum as a source of energy, and
the expanding range of petroleum by-products with diverse market potential, provided the
"demand push" for the systematic deployment of scientific knowledge.  As early as 1860-61,
Lesley included petroleum in his treatment of economic geology at the University of
Pennsylvania.  At Columbia's School of Mines, Francis L. Vinton's instruction in mining discussed
the drilling of artesian, brine, and oil wells, while Charles F. Chandler, its dean and professor of
applied chemistry, devised the flash-point test for kerosene, and was the foremost chemical
consultant for the petroleum industry at the time.47
During the 1880s and 1890s, several pioneer American geologists, notably Israel Charles
White and E.B. Andrews, were employed as consultants by oil operators to help in the location
of deposits in the Appalachian fields.   White successfully worked out various theories on the48
accumulation of petroleum and natural gas, and became the first geologist to make a specialty
of these minerals.  He was professor of geology at the University of West Virginia from 1877 to
1892 and State Geologist from 1897 until his death in 1928.  In California, where production had
taken from 1876 to 1895 to reach an annual output of one million barrels, but doubled in the next
three years, professional petroleum geologists began to be employed in 1897, on the Gulf Coast
about 1900, in Mexico in 1909, and in Oklahoma in 1913.49
Advances in the use of geology proceeded slowly, however, because of resistance from
self-educated practitioners on the oil fields, reflected in such slogans as "oil is where you find it,"
and "geology never filled an oil tank."   An observer around 1900 commented:50
"The opinion of the average oil operator about geologists is today very much
the same as that of the foundryman a generation ago, or the steel producer
two generations ago, in regard to chemists.  It should...be remembered that
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perhaps 75 percent of the prosperous oil operators began as drill hands 
and that their limited education does not usually enable them to understand
or appreciate geological reports."51
According to Williamson et al, much credit must go to the U.S. Geological Survey for its role in
bringing about a marked change in the general attitude of oil men toward geologists, by
publishing reliable field data and popularizing the anticlinal theory of the structure of oil-bearing
strata.  While the major elements of the theory had been worked out before 1900, the discovery
in 1911 of the rich Cushing pool in Oklahoma dramatically demonstrated the theory that
anticlines were favorable places to find oil.  In 1914, the Oklahoma Geological Survey published
a structure-contour map of the Cushing field clearly indicating that the line separating the oil
from the water was parallel to the surface structure contours.  For the next fifteen years, most
new crude discoveries were based on the surface mapping of anticlines.52
5. Mining Education: Forming an Academic-Industrial Nexus
Over roughly the same span of time during which the United States ascended to
leadership in mineral production, the country also became the foremost location for education
in mining engineering and metallurgy.  The formation of such mutually-reinforcing linkages
between this sector of industry and the educational system was by no means inevitable.  To
illustrate this point, consider that despite its control of a large part of world mineral production
in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Spain was far from the forefront of
geological science, metallurgy, or mining technology.  Although the Spanish did found twenty-
five "universities" in America, those scholastic institutions apparently had little regard for
technical education.  The case of Britain may be cited as a second instance:  Although coal, iron,
copper, and lead mining were of growing importance from the latter part of the seventeenth
century, it was not until the Exhibition of 1851 in London that the "Government School of Mines
and Science Applied to the Arts" was established.  The name was changed twice before it became
the Royal School of Mines in 1863. Perhaps it was this British heritage that caused Australia,
despite the great importance of mining for its economy, to invest very little in advanced mining
education in the nineteenth century.  By way of comparison, schools of mining had been53
established, initially under royal patronage, in Sweden in 1684, in Freiberg, Saxony, in 1765, and
in Paris, France, in 1783.   The Bergakademie in Freiberg was the most prestigious institution in54
the mid-nineteenth century, and Americans enrolled there in increasing numbers between 1845
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and the late 1860s, after which time the numbers declined because of the rise of U.S. schools.55
Demands for indigenous training institutions adapted to American conditions began at
the time of the mining boom in Michigan, and accelerated in the wake of the California gold rush.
In 1847 Abbott Lawrence was moved to give $50,000 to Harvard to endow professorships in
geology and engineering.  His accompanying letter reflected the new appreciation of the value
of science to the practical business of mining: "The three great practical branches to which a
scientific education is to be applied are: first, engineering; second, mining in its extended sense,
including metallurgy; third, the inventions and manufacturing of machinery."  Contrary to the
founder's intentions, however, the Lawrence school developed into one of pure science following
the appointment of Louis Aggasiz as professor of zoology and geology, and Eben Horsford as
professor of applied chemistry.56
The first successful school of mines in the United States was opened by Columbia College
in the City of New York, in 1864.  Thomas Egleston, a New Yorker who had returned from the
Ecole des Mines in 1860, was the prime mover, agreeing to serve initially without salary as
professor of mineralogy and metallurgy, and recruiting two others on the same basis.  Twice as
many students (24) appeared on the first day as had been expected, which must have been
gratifying to the three risk-taking faculty members!  During the remainder of the decade a
number of institutions followed suit by offering instruction in mining engineering.  MIT included
a mining course from the time of its founding in 1865.  In the same year, the University of
Michigan established a degree of Mining Engineering,   Yale appointed a professor of mining, and
Harvard established a chair in geology, endowed by a donor whose express intention was to
make it a nucleus of a new School of Practical Mining and Geology.  Lafayette College and Lehigh
University, two institutions located near the anthracite districts, also began to provide instruction
in mining in 1865 and 1866, respectively.  Asa Packer, who gave a half-million dollars and a tract
of land to help found Lehigh in 1866, had made his fortune through mining and transporting
anthracite.  A proposal in 1867 by a Nevada Senator for a National School of Mines was
unsuccessful, but many state-supported institutions were founded not long after.  Foremost
among these was the Colorado School of Mines: established by the territorial legislature in 1870,
it was the first state mining school set up as a separate institution, and had commenced
instruction by 1873.57
In all more than 20 schools in the country granted degrees in mining during 1860-1890.
In 1893, Samuel B. Christy, a professor at the University of California, noted that the United
States had more mining students than any country in Europe except Germany.  Between 1851 and
1890, the Royal School of Mines in London graduated an average of only seven per year, whereas
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the Columbia School of Mines alone produced an average of more than 15 graduates per year
during 1867-1893.   Columbia was far and away the dominant institution in this period.  As early58
as 1871, mining expert John A. Church declared it to be "one of the best schools in the world --
more scientific than Freiberg, more practical than Paris."   According to Christy, of the 87159
mining graduates in the U.S. up to 1892, 402 were products of Columbia. The continuing flow of
trained American mining specialists was reflected in a professional identity and organization that
was distinctly national in character. When the British Institution of Mining and Metallurgy held
its inaugural meeting in London in 1892, the organizers "found it more than a little irksome to
have to acknowledge that in the United States some such organization had been operating
successfully for nearly twenty years." The British viewed the American Institute of Mining
Engineers (founded in 1871) as "at once a reproach and an example to us."60
Enrollment continued to grow from the time of Christy's report, especially at the younger
schools that had been opened in the western states.  At the University of California, which waited
17 years after its founding in 1868 before appointing a professor of mining and metallurgy, the
registration of the mining college increased tenfold between 1893 and 1903.  The mining college,
which had constituted four percent of the total university enrollment in 1893, represented eleven
percent of total enrollment in 1903.  With over 300 students in that year, the school claimed to be
"without doubt the largest mining college in the world."61
The late nineteenth century also saw a growing interaction between mining schools and
industry, culminating in various efforts to bring together engineering science and practical arts.
Professor Henry S. Munroe of the Columbia School organized the "Summer School of Practical
Mining," which helped students become familiar with the working conditions they would meet
after graduation.  Professor Robert H. Richards perfected the "Mining Laboratory," where
practical problems in ore-dressing and metallurgy could be worked out by students.   More62
generally, mining engineers began increasingly to assume managerial and executive roles within
large firms, and this expectation came to be reflected in the curricula of the major mining
schools.   Herbert Hoover, one of the most successful and surely the most famous mining63
engineer of this era, strongly favored this trend toward combining executive and technical
functions, and viewed it as a distinctively American strength.   The contrast was with the64
European tradition of training mining engineers to serve as inspectors, and in regulatory
positions directing the activities of state mining monopolies.  Although resistance to college-
trained men continued to be voiced by self-taught miners and prospectors, the demand for these
skills continued to grow.  "The fact remains," wrote the Mining and Scientific Press in 1915, "that
nearly every successful mining operation of consequence, old or new, is today in the hands of
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experienced technically trained men."65
The 1900 U.S. Census reported 2908 mining engineers, 6034 surveyors, and 8887 chemists,
assayers, and metallurgists.  By 1917, a manpower census for military purposes counted 7,500
mining engineers, with an extremely broad range of professional experience and mineral
specialties (Table 4).  Perhaps even more remarkable is the fact that the same survey found that
2112 of these mining engineers had working experience in foreign countries.  Although Canada
and Mexico were the two largest of these, the experience was in fact widely dispersed among all
of the continents of the world (Table 5).  A survey of graduates of the Colorado School of Mines
between 1900 and 1940 found that 64 percent of them had worked abroad at some time, 39
percent for several years.   The distinctive knowledge and drive of American mining engineers66
attracted attention very early, in mining centers around the world.  In Australia, for example,
most of the large mines were managed by Cornishmen into the 1880s, but these men were
untrained in metallurgy and resistant to the use of new technology.  A turning point in the
industry's history came with the decision in 1886 to recruit highly-paid engineers and
metallurgists from the Rocky Mountain states, such as William H. Patton from the Comstock
lode, and Herman Schlapp from the grimy smelting towns of Colorado.   Later the trend toward67
"Americanization" of mining activity was remarked on, with various combinations of resentment
and admiration, in such faraway locations as Africa, Sibera, and China.    This evidence of68
demand for American mining technology and expertise is perhaps the best confirmation that the
U.S. had by then achieved a position of leadership that was unique in the world.  In this same
trend, of course, one may see the forces that came to undermine the American economy's position
of dominance in world mineral supples.
6. The "Ethos of Exploration"
The rapid rate at which nineteenth century Americans committed themselves to finding
and extracting wealth from the soil seems remarkable when compared with the pace of
geological activities in other countries.  Although domestic coal and iron ore deposits played a
significant role in the rise of  Britain as an economic power, the British government was slow to
encourage resource exploration.  According to one estimate, before World War II, when Britain
spent £70,000 annually on its geological survey, the U.S. spent the equivalent of £1 million.
Compared with the American West, the "mining frontier" in the British Empire advanced slowly.
As late as 1947, expert staff in British geological services overseas -- in an empire that was then
still intact -- totaled fifty-eight.   An illustration of the difference in priorities is provided by the69
Indian industrialist J. N. Tata to establish a modern steel industry in India during the 1890s.  After
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visiting steel plants in Britain and Germany as well as the United States, Tata decided to throw
his lot with the Americans.  When the American advising team arrived, they immediately set in
motion an exhaustive search for iron ore in convenient locations.  Within a short time they found
one of the richest hematite deposits in the world, at Gurumaishini Hill, which the British
imperialists had somehow overlooked.   Sometimes when it comes to exploration, believing is70
seeing.
A strongly developed American "ethos of exploration"  -- something like a national
consensus that major mineral discoveries could (still) be made, and that public policies should
create and maintain a scientific and technological infrastructure supporting private undertakings
for that purpose -- emerged from the congressional and scientific community's debates over the
establishment of the Geological Survey.  The absence of expectations of new discoveries may be
a more potent source of persistent resource underdevelopment than the usual list of reasons
suggested: small population, large land size, difficult climate, forbidding landscape, and so forth.
Belated development of mineral resources in Australia provides a point of comparison.  While
it is true that a combination of adverse factors discouraged resource exploitation in Australia,
many of these same factors were present in the frontier days of the United States.  Certainly the
population of Australia has been small for a country of its size, not exceeding 8 million as late as
the 1940s.  Further, the harsh climate of the large desert areas has discouraged migration from
coastal areas.  But the American Far West shared many of these conditions: San Francisco had
only 450 inhabitants in 1847, and Utah and Arizona are not famous for their gentle climate.
Rather, what seems to have been absent in Australia is the atmosphere of buoyant
expectations about major new discoveries.  The lack of expectations led to misguided policies and
lack of survey effort.  In 1938, when Australia had recently begun to export iron ore on a small
scale and gave promise of expanding traffic, the government imposed an embargo on all iron ore
shipments in an effort to conserve the remaining supply -- one that remained in place for the next
twenty-five years.  The policy was justified by a report to the Commonwealth in May 1938: "it
is certain that if the known supplies of high grade ore are not conserved Australia will in little
more than a generation become an importer rather than a producer of iron ore."  As late as 1953,71
the Economist reported: "...although most surface deposits in Australia have now been discovered
and developed, no complete geological survey has been made and it is impossible to say how
many minerals lie, as they are said to lie in the Sahara, below the barren surface of the Australian
desert."   When the Australian policy regime was decisively changed in the 1960s, lifting the72
embargo and offering state encouragement to exploration and construction of new ore terminals,
a dramatic series of new discoveries opened up previously unknown deposits, not only of iron
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ore but of copper, nickel, bauxite, uranium, phosphate rock and petroleum.  By late 1967, proved
reserves of iron ore of over 50 percent metal content were already more than 40 times the level
of ten years earlier.73
Prior to the 1960s, Australians accepted any number of rationalizations for the absence
of  important minerals such as petroleum: Oil could not be found south of the equator.
Australia's rocks were too old to contain oil.  The country had been so thoroughly scoured by
prospectors that surely nothing valuable could remain to be found.  But this very attitude could
lead to lethargic and therefore self-confirming search effort.  When a search party from the Weipa
mission on the Cape York Peninsula found extensive outbreaks of bauxite in 1955, geologist
Harry Evans said to himself: "As the journey down the coast revealed miles of bauxite cliffs, I
kept thinking that, if all this is bauxite, then there must be something the matter with it; otherwise
it would have been discovered and appreciated long ago."  Indeed there was nothing wrong with
it: by 1964 Weipa held about one-quarter of the known potential bauxite resources in the world.74
The historian of Australian mining concludes: "One consistent lesson in the history of Australian
mining is the correlation between intelligent searching and discovery... The halo of romance, of
luck and unpredictability, which traditionally surrounds the discovery of a mining field obscured
this correlation.75
Increasingly the "intelligent searching" came to be performed by corporate organizations,
mobilizing teams of highly trained professionals using sophisticated scientific methods.
Specialized exploration companies began to appear at the end of the nineteenth century,
sometimes affiliated with giant mining enterprises, sometimes with vertically-integrated
manufacturing firms whose planning horizons continued to expand over both time and space.
When its apex-law disputes were terminated by consolidation after 1906, Anaconda expanded
its geolocal work on a district-wide basis, setting the new professional standard for mineral
zoning and mapping. One examination made for the Guggenheim Exploration Company of Utah
Copper Company property in 1903, required sixteen junior engineers as assistants, involved 3,500
samples, took seven months and more than $150,000 to complete.   One must allow, therefore,76
that part of the American "ethos" included the willingness to allow these huge corporations a
largely free rein over the American countryside.
Sooner or later, it was inevitable that these broadening horizons would extend into
foreign countries.  Convinced that it needed to control a secure supply of bauxite a generation
ahead of its immediate requirements, the aluminium company Alcoa invested heavily in bauxite
mining and development, first in Arkansas in the early 1900s, then in British Guiana as early as
1916, and in central America in the 1950s.   The Weipa bauxite field in Australia was in fact77
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developed in partnership with the Kaiser Alumnium and Chemical Corporation of the United
States.  As the "ethos of exploration" came more and more to reside in the planning departments
of corporations with global horizons, the links between resource discoveries and regional or
national development performance became correspondingly weaker.  
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6. Conclusion
After the Civil War the U.S. became the world's leading mineral producer, dominating
the international production league-tables across virtually the entire range of major industrial
minerals. Although these developments had roots in the antebellum history of mining on the
North American continent, the abruptness of the transition after 1865, the fact that mining had
remained so limited an activity throughout the preceding epoch of European settlement, and the
simultaneity of the expansion  in so many separate branches of the minerals sector, all suggest
that it is too simple to say merely that geological good fortune had favored the country with a
rich "natural" endowment.  Instead, we have argued, the condition of natural resource abundance
is one that in general should be viewed as having been "socially constructed" rather than
geologically fore-ordained, and the rise of the U.S. minerals economy in this particular era
therefore needs to be analyzed as an endogenous phenomenon --  part and parcel of  the national
economic development process.
Set against the background of expanding domestic and international demands for coal,
iron ore, copper, bauxite, petroleum, and many other industrial minerals (and the more
erratically growing monetary requirements for silver and gold), our discussion  highlights the
complex legal, institutional, technological and organizational adaptations that shaped the supply-
responses of individuals and business firms in the U.S.   Their combined effects -- in mobilizing
resources and knowledge for more systematic exploration, for rationalized, large-scale
exploitation of mineral deposits, and for increasingly efficient smelting and refining of the raw
materials extracted from the earth -- had created highly elastic supply conditions for American
mineral products.  This, in turn, facilitated and may even have contributed to inducing the
growing mineral resource intensity of  U..S. industrial productions and exports during the early
decades of the twentieth century.  Whereas the substitution of materials mined from the earth for
those gathered from the forests traditionally is accorded a  place in accounts of the Industrial
Revolution of the eighteenth century, and whereas historians of technology have recognized that
the same substitutions of minerals for wood were delayed in the American industrial expansion
in the first half of the nineteenth century, we believe the  significance of the subsequent American
minerals development boom has gone largely unrecognized and under-appreciated.  Recent
reinterpretations of the British Industrial Revolution by economic historians working within the
growth accounting framework have tended to downplay even the "supporting actor" roles
traditionally assigned to coal and iron.  On the other hand, the careful examination of Britain's
energy requirements in that era by Wrigley  and Thomas, and the emphasis which the work of
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John Harris gives to the minerals sector as the distinctive locus of English industrial skill
development, indicate that the revisionists are perhaps missing some important parts of the story.
Indeed, our examination of the late nineteenth century American experience suggests that a
cross-country and cross-century comparative study of the "social construction of natural resource
abundance" would be well worth undertaking. 
  For many economists, the greater role for primary production and natural resources in
pre-twentieth-century economic growth implies that the principle of diminishing returns was
then operative to a far greater degree than is the case in the present century.   Natural resources
still are viewed as the last of the exogenous factors in an economic growth process whose other
constituents increasingly have come to be treated as endogenous.   The dependence of78
industrialization on consumption of exhaustible minerals has been seen, at least from the time
of  W. S. Jevons' The Coal Question, as exerting a progressively heavier drag on the rate of
economic growth -- albeit, one that might be overcome by a quickening of the pace of
technological innovation. This analytical association of mineral-intensive development with
diminishing returns, and the corresponding disposition to disparage the role of natural resouces
in successful industrialization, seem to us the unfortunate legacy of an insufficiently attentive
reading of the historical record.  In the preceding pages, we not only have called attention to the
many respects in which the economically effective mineral resource base was not a "given", not
simply a geological endowment, exogenously provided for use in the American economy; we
have gone farther, in identifying several strong "positive feedback" mechanisms present in the
developmental dynamics of  the depletable resource industries, and in noticing significant
elements of increasing returns in the processes of minerals discovery, extraction, and utilization.
We have grouped the forces of social construction under three headings: development of
an infrastructure of public scientific knowledge; investment in mining education; and the "ethos
of exploration," by which term we encompass the broad cultural complex that lay behind the
belief in the desirability and feasibility of continuing mineral discoveries, and the accommodating
legal and political environments supporting  these developments.  With minor relabeling, these
categories could well be described as the components of sucessful  modern-day regime of
knowledge-based economic growth.  In many respects, the minerals economy was integral to the
emerging knowledge-based sectors of the twentieth century U.S.  economy. 
We also find parallels between the historical experience recounted here and modern
instances that have drawn the attention of "new growth theorists" to the role of increasing returns
to scale and other sources of  positive feedback to the spatial localization of innovation. Our
analysis has shown that a variety of factors tended to create geographical clusterings of high
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profit opportunities in minerals development, not simply as a reflection of a comparable spatial
concentration in the underlying geological deposits.  First, there were knowledge spillovers from
one mineral to another.  A thorough search of a given territory, made with the objective, say, of
locating deposits of gold and silver, simultaneously augmented knowledge about the existence
and location therein of copper, lead and zinc deposits.  Breakthroughs in the technologies of
separating one metal from its ore were readily transferred to other ores, and frequently, in the
course of such applications a range of new recoverable byproducts were generated.   A second
source of increasing returns was lumpiness in physical  infrastructure investments.
Transportation facilities are a good example: tracks that were laid to service the gold and silver
fields also lowered the marginal costs of access to other mineral deposits in adjacent districts.
The same principle applied in the case of  institutional infrastructures as well, providing a third
source.  The federal geological surveys, for example, although initiated and institutionalized in
the coal-fuel era, had their greatest payoffs in the petroleum discoveries of the twentieth century.
 Similarly, the institutional linkage among mining firms, mining schools, the USGS, and the
American Institute of Mining Engineers is a good example  of a technological information-
transmission network, facilitating the accretion and dissemination of useful knowledge from one
setting to another within the common geopolitical territory.
Many and perhaps most of these positive feedback mechanisms had their greatest impact
within the geopolitical territory known as the United States, at least during the era under
examination.  Many were geographically defined by their very nature, as in the examples of
transportation facilities and mapmaking.  Others were largely national in scope for evident
historical reasons.  The accommodating legal and political setting, for example, was not routinely
extendable across national boundaries.  It was only to be expected that the graduates of American
mining schools would find employment most readily with the regional mining companies who
had close relationships with their instructors, and who worked in a relatively familiar geological
and business environment.  In all of these ways, increasing returns were manifest in mineral
resource abundance at the national level, with important consequences for American
industrialization and world economic leadership.
More fundamentally, however, the spillovers of knowledge from the American minerals
sector proved not to be containable within the nation's borders.  The very fact of
professionalization, and the linkage of mining education to university departments concerned
with general principles as well as specifically useful techniques, made it more likely that the
knowledge and skills generated in the American minerals sector would be found useful when
transferred to other parts of the world. And, quite plausibly, because American mining eningeers
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were educated and accustomed to meeting the needs of minerals producers over a wider and
more varied geological terrain, the knowldge transfers abroad were accomplished more quickly
and easily than was the  case when the experts involved had been recruited from the craft-based
traditions of British mining.   Although it was hardly an instantaneous process,  these knowledge
transfers were  rapid enough in the years following World War II to become an important force
weakening the links between  domestic mineral resources an the performance of  America's
industry.  Today the U.S imports at the margin virtually every one of the major industrial
minerals, a state of affairs that hold true for nearly all of the successful industrial nations of the
world.  Perhaps it is the context and vantage point created by the  rapid postwar globalization
of the minerals economy that accounts for the otherwise puzzling neglect of this important
chapter in American economic history.                    
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TABLE 1. US SHARE OF WORLD TOTALS
(percent)
1913 1989 1989 Reserves plus 1989 Reserve Base plus
Output Reserves Cumulative 1913-1989 Cumulative 1913-1989
Petroleum 65 2.96 19.77
Copper 56 16.40 19.94 18.50
Phosphate 43 9.80 36.30 15.43
Coal 39 23.00 23.32
Bauxite 37 0.17 0.52 0.50
Zinc 37 13.89 13.96 15.58
Iron Ore 36 10.46 11.56 7.39
Lead 34 15.70 18.13 18.79
Gold 20 11.50 8.61 8.43
SOURCES:  Minerals Yearbook; The Mineral Industry Its
Statistics, Technology and Trade; American Petroleum Institute,
Basic Petroleum Data Book, Volume X (September 1990);
National Coal Association, International Coal; COE/EIA, Annual
Prospects for World Coal Trade 1991.
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TABLE 2.  EUROPEAN SHARE OF WORLD TOTALS
(percent)
1913 1989 1989 Reserves plus 1989 Reserve Base plus
Output Reserves Cumulative 1913-1989 Cumulative 1913-1989
Petroleum 4.70 4.83(a) 9.02
Copper 10.30 6.80 7.04 4.50
Phosphate 8.60 0.20 0.42 0.31
Coal 55.00 13.00 16.82
Bauxite 60.00 6.10 7.09 17.09
Zinc 67.90 18.10 20.40 17.09
Iron Ore 58.20 3.44 6.28 5.38
Lead 48.50 12.90 18.11 16.31
Gold 1.00 6.10 2.62 2.56
a:  Western Europe plus Communist Nations except USSR
SOURCES:  Same as Table 1.  European countries are Albania,
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Greenland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and
Yugoslavia.
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TABLE 3.  USSR SHARE OF WORLD TOTALS
(percent)
1913 1989 1989 Reserves plus 1989 Reserve Base plus
Output Reserves Cumulative 1913-1989 Cumulative 1913-1989
Petroleum 29.0 6.44 18.02
Copper 3.4 0.70 4.72 8.79
Phosphate 0.0 10.60 19.08 5.44
Coal 2.5 22.00 21.04
Bauxite 0.0 1.40 1.92 1.71
Zinc 0.0 6.90 9.20 7.56
Iron Ore 5.7 39.07 36.41 24.39
Lead 0.1 14.20 10.98 10.83
Gold 5.4 1.40 10.99 10.81
SOURCES:  Same as Table 1.
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TABLE 4.  EXPERIENCE OF US MINING ENGINEERS, 1917
Metallurgy (all kinds) 2,920
Development Work 2,325
Surveying, mine or topographic 1,935
Construction (building) 1,770
Erection of Machinery 1,050
Ore Concentration 1,038
Designing and drafting 945
Explosives (mine and quarry) 863
Prospecting (boring machines) 840
Construction (machinery) 735
Assaying 718
Drainage and pumping 563
Steam-shovel mining 330
Hydraulic mining 173
Quarrying 165
Dredging 115
Dike and levee construction 98
Tunnel and shaft work 83
Miscellaneous* 1,615
* Includes 467 consulting mining engineers; 312 geologists; 121 professors of mining,
metallurgy, and geology.
SOURCE:  Albert H. Fay, “Census of Mining Engineers,
Metallurgists, and Chemists,” United States Bureau of Mines
Technical Paper No. 179 (1917), pp. 8-9.
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TABLE 5.  EXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES OF US MINING ENGINEERS
AND CHEMISTS, 1917
Mining Engineers Chemists
Africa 74 13
Australasia 46 19
Austria-Hungary 7 24
Canada 384 203
Central America 74 15
Cuba 68 60
Europe
     Belgium 6 6
     Denmark 1 19
     France 23 38
     Great Britain 116 117
     Germany 61 231
     Holland 2 10
     Italy 5 11
     Norway-Sweden 19 21
     Russia 25 30
     Spain 7 5
     Switzerland 8 18
     Others 22 10
     Not Specified 101 171
Far East 105 80
Greenland 3
India 11
Mexico 679 117
Newfoundland 7
South America 241 34
West Indies 17 32
SOURCE:  Albert H. Fay, “Census of Mining Engineers,
Metallurgists and Chemists,” United States Bureau of Mines
Technical Paper No. 179 (1917), p. 11.
